

Probabilistic Reasoning as Information Compression by Multiple Alignment, Unification and Search: An Introduction and Overview*

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Abstract

This article introduces the idea that probabilistic reasoning (PR) may be understood as *information compression by multiple alignment, unification and search* (ICMAUS). In this context, multiple alignment has a meaning which is similar to but distinct from its meaning in bio-informatics, while unification means a simple merging of matching patterns, a meaning which is related to but simpler than the meaning of that term in logic.

A software model, SP61, has been developed for the discovery and formation of ‘good’ multiple alignments, evaluated in terms of information compression. The model is described in outline.

Using examples from the SP61 model, this article describes in outline how the ICMAUS framework can model various kinds of PR including: PR in best-match pattern recognition and information retrieval; one-step ‘deductive’ and ‘abductive’ PR; inheritance of attributes in a class hierarchy; chains of reasoning (probabilistic decision networks and decision trees, and PR with ‘rules’); geometric analogy problems; nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning with default values; modelling the function of a Bayesian network.

Key Words: Probabilistic reasoning; multiple alignment; unification; information compression.

Category: SD I.2.3.

1 Introduction

Quoting Benjamin Franklin (“Nothing is certain but death and taxes”), Ginsberg [Ginsberg 94, p. 2] writes that: “The view that Franklin was expressing

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is that virtually every conclusion we draw [in reasoning] is an uncertain one.” He goes on to say: “This sort of reasoning in the face of uncertainty ... has ... proved to be remarkably difficult to formalise.”

This article introduces the idea that *probabilistic reasoning* (PR) may be understood as a process of *information compression* (IC) by *multiple alignment* with *unification* and *search* (ICMAUS). The article is intended as a summary or overview of research which is described in more details elsewhere [Wolff 98a, Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c]. In the space available, it is only possible to present a sketch of the main ideas. Many details are omitted and there is only brief discussion of assumptions and related issues.

In the ICMAUS framework, *multiple alignment* (MA) has a meaning which is similar to but distinct from its meaning in bio-informatics while *unification* means a simple merging of matching patterns, a meaning which is related to but simpler than the meaning of that term in logic. The term search in this context means the systematic exploration of the abstract space of possible alignments, normally constrained in some way (using heuristic techniques or otherwise) to achieve useful results in realistic timescales.

In this article, the way in which the IC associated with any alignment may be calculated is described in outline together with a brief description of SP61, a software model designed to discover and construct MAs which are ‘good’ in terms of IC. More detail may be found in [Wolff 98a, Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c].

With examples from the SP61 model, the main body of the article presents an overview of how the ICMAUS framework can accommodate a variety of kinds of PR including:

- Best-match pattern recognition and information retrieval.
- Inheritance of attributes in a class hierarchy.
- One-step ‘deductive’ and ‘abductive’ reasoning.
- Chains of reasoning:
 - Reasoning with probabilistic decision networks and decision trees.
 - Reasoning with ‘rules’.
- Reasoning with default values.
- Nonmonotonic reasoning.
- Solving geometric analogy problems.
- ICMAUS as a possible alternative to Bayesian networks.

Topics which are discussed in [Wolff 98b] but are omitted from this article include: recognition of patterns with internal structure (illustrated with an example of medical diagnosis); multiple inheritance; and the recognition of polythetic categories. Topics which are discussed in [Wolff 98c] but omitted here include: modelling of ‘variables’ with ‘values’ and ‘types’; hypothetical (“what

if”) reasoning; indirection in information retrieval; and the representation of knowledge in the ICMAUS framework.

For the sake of clarity and to save space, the examples presented in Section 5 and the following sections are relatively small. However, the SP61 model is capable of handling more complicated examples as can be seen in [Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c, Wolff 98d1]. The scaling properties of the model are good (see Section 3.4.1).

1.1 Background and context

The proposals in these articles have been developed within a programme of research developing the ‘SP’ conjecture that:

All kinds of computing and formal reasoning may usefully be understood as information compression by multiple alignment, unification and search,

and developing a ‘new generation’ computing system based on this thinking.¹

Background thinking for this research programme is described in [Wolff 93] and [Wolff 95a]. In addition to PR, the concepts have so far been developed in relation to the following fields: *best-match information retrieval and pattern recognition* [Wolff 94a]; *parsing of natural language* [Wolff 98d1]; and *automation of software design and the execution of software functions* [Wolff 94b].

Although the ICMAUS framework has not yet been developed for learning, the entire programme of research is based on earlier research on *unsupervised inductive learning* [Wolff 91, Wolff 88, Wolff 82] which is itself based on principles of Minimum Length Encoding (MLE², see [Cheeseman 90, Pednault 91, Rissanen 78, Solomonoff 64, Wallace and Boulton 68, Li and Vitányi 97]). A preliminary account of the ICMAUS framework and its range of applications in learning and reasoning was presented in [Wolff 96c] at a stage before a working model had been developed or the concepts had been quantified.

It has been argued [Wolff 98e] that the ICMAUS framework provides an interpretation in terms of IC of the Post Canonical System and Universal Turing Machine models of computing.

1.1.1 Research on probabilistic reasoning

There is now a huge literature on PR and related ideas ranging over ‘standard’ parametric and non-parametric statistics; *ad hoc* uncertainty measures in early expert systems; Bayesian statistics; Bayesian/belief/causal networks; Markov networks; Self-Organising Feature Maps; fuzzy set theory and ‘soft’ computing’;

¹IC may be interpreted as a process of removing unnecessary (redundant) complexity in information - and thus maximising *simplicity* - whilst preserving as much as possible of its non-redundant descriptive *power*. Hence the name ‘SP’ applied to the central conjecture and other aspects of this research.

²MLE is used here as an umbrella term for Minimum Message Length encoding and Minimum Description Length encoding.

the Dempster-Shaffer theory; abductive reasoning; nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning with default values; autoepistemic logic, defeasible logic, probabilistic, possibilistic and other kinds of logic designed to accommodate uncertainty; MLE; algorithmic probability and algorithmic complexity theory; truth maintenance systems; decision analysis; utility theory; and so on.

A well-known authoritative survey of the field, with an emphasis on Bayesian networks, is provided by Judea Pearl [Pearl 88] although this book is now, perhaps, in need of some updating. A useful review from the same year is [Grunwald 97].

A more recent collection of articles, which together provide a broad coverage of the subject, appears in [Gabbay *et al.* 94]. A relatively short but useful review of “uncertainty handling formalisms” is provided by [Parsons and Hunter 98]. Regarding the application of different kinds of ‘logic’ to nonmonotonic and uncertain reasoning, there is a mine of useful information in the articles in [Gabbay *et al.* 94] covering such things as ‘default logic’, ‘autoepistemic logic’, ‘circumscription’, ‘defeasible logic’, ‘uncertainty logics’ and ‘possibilistic logic’. In that volume, the chapter by Ginsberg [Ginsberg 94] provides an excellent introduction to the problems of nonmonotonic reasoning.

Papers by [Cussens and Hunter 92, Bondarenko *et al.* 97, Kern-Isberner 98, Kohlas *et al.* 98, Schaub and Bruning 98, Schurz 98] are also relevant as are the papers in [Gammerman 96].

1.1.2 Information compression and probabilistic reasoning

Naturally enough, much of the literature on probabilistic reasoning deals directly with concepts of probability, especially conditional probability. Since, however, there is a close connection between probability and compression (mediated by coding schemes such as the Huffman coding scheme - see, for example, [Cove and Thomas 91] - or the Shannon-Fano-Elias coding scheme, *ibid.*), concepts of probability imply corresponding concepts of compression.

That said, a primary emphasis on compression rather than probability provides an alternative perspective on the subject which may prove useful. Relevant sources include [Cussens and Hunter 92, Dagu and Luby 97, Grunwald 97, Grunwald 98, Li and Vitányi 97, Schaub and Bruning 98, van der Gaag 96] and [Watanabe 72].

2 Multiple alignment problems

The term *multiple alignment* is normally associated with the computational analysis of (symbolic representations of) sequences of DNA bases or sequences of amino acid residues as part of the process of elucidating the structure, functions or evolution of the corresponding molecules. The aim of the computation is to find one or more alignments of matching symbols in two or more sequences which are, in some sense, ‘good’. Possible meanings for that term are discussed

```

      G G A      G      C A G G G A G G A      T G      G      G G A
      | | |      |      | | | | | | | | |      | |      |      | | |
      G G | G      G C C C A G G G A G G A      | G G C G      G G A
      | | |      | | | | | | | | | | |      | |      |      | | |
A | G A C T G C C C A G G G | G G | G C T G      G A | G A
      | | |      | | | | | | | | |      | |      |      | | |
      G G A A      | A G G G A G G A      | A G      G      G G A
      | | |      | | | | | | | | |      | |      |      | | |
      G G C A      C A G G G A G G      C      G      G      G G A

```

Figure 1: A ‘good’ alignment amongst five DNA sequences (adapted from Fig. 6 in [Roytberg 92], with permission from Oxford University Press).

in Section 3.3, below. An example of an alignment of DNA sequences is shown in Figure 1.

In this area of research, it is widely recognised that the number of possible alignments of symbols is normally too large to be searched exhaustively and that, to achieve a search which has acceptable speed and acceptable scaling properties, ‘heuristic’ techniques must normally be used. Heuristic techniques include ‘hill climbing’ (sometimes called ‘descent’), ‘beam search’, ‘genetic algorithms’, ‘simulated annealing’, ‘dynamic programming’ and others. With these techniques, searching is done in stages, with a progressive narrowing of the search in successive stages using some kind of measure of goodness of alignments to guide the search. These techniques may be described generically as ‘metrics-guided search’.

With these techniques, ideal solutions cannot normally be guaranteed but acceptably good approximate solutions can normally be found without excessive computational demands.

There is now a fairly large literature about methods for finding good alignments amongst two or more sequences of symbols. Some of the existing methods are reviewed in [Barton 90, Chan *et al.* 92, Day and McMorris 92, Taylor 88].

Because of the way in which the concept of MA has been generalised in this research (see next), none of the current methods for finding MAs are suitable for incorporation in the proposed SP system. Hence the development of a new method, outlined in Section 2.1.

2.1 Generalisation of the concept of multiple alignment

In this research, the concept of MA has been generalised in the following way:

1. One (or more) of the sequences of symbols to be aligned has a special status and is designated as ‘New’. The way in which the concept of ‘New’ appears to relate to established concepts in computing is shown in Table 1.
2. All other sequences are designated as ‘Old’. The way in which the concept

of ‘Old’ appears to relate to established concepts in computing is also shown in Table 1.

3. A ‘good’ alignment is one which, through the unification of symbols in New with symbols in Old, and through unifications amongst the symbols in Old, leads to a relatively large amount of compression of New in terms of the sequences in Old. How this may be done is explained in Section 3.3, below.
4. An implication of this way of framing the alignment problem is that, by contrast with ‘multiple alignment’ as normally understood in bio-informatics, any given sequence in Old may appear two or more times in any one alignment and may therefore be aligned with itself (with the obvious restriction that any one instance of a symbol may **not** be aligned with itself).³

It should be clear that this concept of MA (and the bio-informatics version of the concept) may be generalised to two-dimensional (or even higher-dimensional) patterns. There is likely to be a case, at some stage in the SP research programme, for extending the ideas described in this article into the domain of two or more dimensions.

3 The ICMAUS framework

The main concepts to be presented can probably best be described with reference to a simple example. Since ‘parsing’ in the sense understood in theoretical linguistics and natural language processing has come to be a paradigm for the several concepts to be described, it will provide our first example despite the fact that, when the input sentence or phrase to be parsed is complete, there is no significant PR as understood in this article. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 show how the parsing of a *very* simple sentence with a *very* simple grammar may be understood as MA. Much more elaborate examples can be found in [Wolff 98d1].

3.1 Representing a grammar with patterns of symbols

Figure 2 shows a simple context-free phrase-structure grammar (CF-PSG) describing a fragment of the syntax of English. This grammar generates the four sentences ‘j o h n r u n s’, ‘j o h n w a l k s’, ‘s u s a n r u n s’, and ‘s u s a n w

³With the kind of MA shown in Figure 1, it is obviously possible to include two or more *copies* of a given sequence in any one alignment. To my knowledge, this is never done in practice because it would simply lead to the trivial alignment of each symbol in one copy with the corresponding symbol or symbols in one or more other copies. What is proposed for the ICMAUS framework is different: any *one* pattern may appear two or more times in an alignment. Each appearance is just that - it is an *appearance* of *one* pattern, not a duplicate *copy* of a pattern. Since each appearance of a pattern represents the same pattern, it makes no sense to match a symbol from one appearance with the corresponding symbol in another appearance because this is simply matching one instance of the symbol with itself. Any such match is spurious and must be forbidden.

| <i>Area of application</i> | <i>New</i> | <i>Old</i> |
|--|---|---|
| Unsupervised inductive learning | 'Raw' data. | Grammar or other knowledge structure created by learning. |
| Parsing | The sentence to be parsed. | The grammar used for parsing. |
| Pattern recognition and scene analysis | A pattern to be recognised or scene to be analysed. | The stored knowledge used to recognise one pattern or several within a scene. |
| Databases | A 'query' in SQL or other query language. | Records stored in the database. |
| Expert system | A 'query' in the query language for the expert system. | The 'rules' or other knowledge stored in the expert system. |
| Computer program | The 'data' or 'parameters' supplied to the program on each run. | The computer program itself. |

Table 1: The way in which the concepts of 'New' and 'Old' in this research appear to relate to established concepts in computing.

```

S -> N V
N -> j o h n
N -> s u s a n
V -> w a l k s
V -> r u n s

```

Figure 2: A CF-PSG describing a fragment of English syntax.

a l k s'. Any of these sentences may be parsed in terms of the grammar, giving a labelled bracketing like this:

(S(N j o h n)(V r u n s))

or an equivalent representation in the form of a tree.

Figure 3 shows the grammar from Figure 2 expressed as a set of *strings*, *sequences* or *patterns*⁴ of symbols. Each pattern in this ‘grammar’ is like a re-write rule in the CF-PSG notation except that the rewrite arrow has been removed, some other symbols have been introduced (‘0’, ‘1’ and symbols with an initial ‘#’ character) and there is a number to the right of each rule.^{5, 6, 7}

The number to the right of each rule in Figure 3 is an imaginary frequency of occurrence of the rule in a parsing of a notional sample of the language. These frequencies of occurrence will be discussed later.

The reasons for the symbols which have been added to each rule will become clear but a few words of explanation are in order here. The symbols ‘0’ and ‘1’ have been introduced to differentiate the two versions of the ‘N’ patterns and the two versions of the ‘V’ patterns. They enter into matching and unification

⁴In this programme of research, the term *pattern* means an array of symbols in one *or more* dimensions. This includes arrays in two or more dimensions as well as one-dimensional sequences. Although one-dimensional sequences will be the main focus of our attention in this article, the term *pattern* will be used as a reminder that the concept of multiple alignment in this research includes alignments of patterns in two or more dimensions. Formal definitions of terms like *pattern* and *symbol* are provided in Appendix A1 of [Wolff 98a].

⁵For the remainder of this article, quote marks will be dropped when referring to any grammar like that in Figure 3 which is expressed as patterns of symbols. Likewise, the word ‘rule’ with respect to this kind of grammar will be referred to without quote marks.

⁶This example of a grammar and how it is used in parsing may give the impression that the ICMAUS framework is merely a trivial variation of familiar concepts of context-free phrase-structure grammar (CF-PSG) with their well-known inadequacies for representing and analysing the ‘context sensitive’ structures found in natural languages. The examples presented in [Wolff 98d1] show that the ICMAUS framework is much more ‘powerful’ than CF-PSGs and can accommodate quite subtle context-sensitive features of natural language syntax in a simple and elegant manner. Achieving this expressive power with a relatively simple notation is made possible by the relatively sophisticated search processes which lie at the heart of the SP model.

⁷For the sake of clarity in exposition and to save space, all the grammars shown in this article are much simpler than in any practical system. For similar reasons, all examples of MAs which are presented have been chosen so that they are small enough to fit on one page without resorting to font sizes which are too small to read. However, for the reasons given in Section 3.4.1, the model appears to be general and scalable to realistically large knowledge structures and alignments.

```

S N #N V #V #S (1000)
N 0 j o h n #N (300)
N 1 s u s a n #N (700)
V 0 w a l k s #V (650)
V 1 r u n s #V (350)

```

Figure 3: A simple grammar written as patterns of symbols. For each rule, there is a number on the right representing the frequency of occurrence of the rule in a notional sample of the language.

in exactly the same way as other symbols. Although the symbols are the same as are used in other contexts to represent numbers they do not have the meaning of numbers in this grammar.

The symbols which begin with ‘#’ (e.g., ‘#S’, ‘#NP’) serve as ‘termination markers’ for patterns in the grammar. Although their informal description as ‘termination markers’ suggests that these symbols are meta symbols with special meaning, they have no hidden meaning and they enter into matching and unification like every other symbol.

In general, all the symbols which can be seen in Figure 3 enter into matching and unification in the same way. Although some of these symbols can be seen to serve a distinctive role, there is no hidden meaning attached to any of them; and there is no formal distinction between upper- and lower-case letters or between digit symbols and alphabetic symbols - and so on.⁸

3.2 Parsing as an alignment of a sentence and rules in a grammar

Figure 4 shows how a parsing of the sentence ‘j o h n r u n s’ may be seen as an alignment of patterns which includes the sentence pattern and other patterns from the grammar shown in Figure 3.

The similarity between this alignment and the conventional parsing may be seen if the symbols in the alignment are ‘projected’ on to a single sequence, thus:

```
S N 0 j o h n #N V 1 r u n s #V #S.
```

In this projection, the two instances of ‘N’ in the second column of the alignment have been merged or ‘unified’, and likewise for the two instances of ‘#N’ in the eighth column, and so on wherever there are two or more instances of a symbol in any column.

⁸The foregoing assertions are not strictly true of the method of evaluating alignments which is used in the SP61 model. The principle of “no meta symbols” and thus “no hidden meanings for symbols” is an ideal which this research aims to attain. But, as a temporary solution to the problem of scoring alignments in the SP61 model, pending something better, a distinction has been recognised between symbols which begin with ‘#’ and all other symbols (details of the scoring method are presented in Section 4 of [Wolff 98a]).

| | | | | | | |
|---|-----|------------|------|------------|-------|---|
| 0 | | j o h n | | r u n s | | 0 |
| | | | | | | |
| 1 | N 0 | j o h n #N | | | | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
| 2 | S N | | #N V | | #V #S | 2 |
| | | | | | | |
| 3 | | | V 1 | r u n s #V | | 3 |

Figure 4: Parsing of the sentence ‘j o h n r u n s’ as an alignment amongst sequences representing the sentence and relevant rules in the grammar in Figure 3.

This projection is the same as the conventional parsing except that ‘0’ and ‘1’ symbols are included, right bracket symbols (‘)’) are replaced by ‘termination markers’ and each left bracket is replaced by an upper-case symbol which may also be regarded as a ‘label’ for the structure.

As was noted in Section 2.1, the sentence or other sequence of symbols to be parsed is regarded as New, while the rules in the grammar are regarded as Old. For the sake of readability and ease of interpretation, New is normally placed at the top of each alignment with patterns from Old below it.

For the sake of clarity in Figure 4 and other alignments shown later, each appearance of a pattern in any alignment is given a line to itself. Apart from the convention that New is always at the top, the order in which patterns appear (from top to bottom of the alignment) is entirely arbitrary. An alignment in which the patterns appear in one order is entirely equivalent to an alignment in which they appear in any other order, provided all other aspects of the alignment are the same.

3.3 Evaluation of an alignment in terms of IC

What is the difference between a ‘good’ alignment and a ‘bad’ one? Intuitively, a good alignment is one which has many *hits* (positive matches between symbols), few *gaps* (sequences of one or more symbols which are not part of any hit) and, where there are gaps, they should be as short as possible.

It is possible to use measures like these directly in computer programs for finding good MAs and, indeed, they commonly are. However, our confidence in the validity of measures like these may be increased if they can be placed within a broader theoretical framework. Concepts of information, IC, and related concepts of probability provide a suitable framework. Work on the evaluation of MAs in this tradition includes [Allison and Wallace 94, Allison *et al.* 92, Chan *et al.* 92, Felsenstein 81, Reichert *et al.* 73, Wolff 94a].

As was indicated in Section 2.1, *a good alignment is defined here as one which provides a basis for an economical coding of New in terms of the patterns Old*. There is no space here to describe in detail the method of evaluation which is used in the ICMAUS framework and in SP61. The outline description here should give readers an intuitive grasp of the method. A much fuller description may be found in Section 4 of [Wolff 98a].

At the most fine-grained level in an alignment like the one shown in Figure 4, individual symbols may be encoded using Huffman coding or Shannon-Fano-Elias (S-F-E) coding (see [Cove and Thomas 91]) to take advantage of variations in the frequencies of symbol types.

For individual words in New, patterns like those shown in Figure 3 provide suitable codes. Thus, for the example shown in Figure 4, ‘j o h n’ may be encoded with the symbols ‘N 0 #N’ and ‘r u n s’ may be encoded with ‘V 1 #V’. If ‘j o h n r u n s’ were encoded purely at the level of words, the result would be ‘N 0 #N V 1 #V’ which is not much shorter (in numbers of symbols) than the original sentence. However, we can take advantage of the fact that within the pattern ‘N 0 #N V 1 #V’, there is a subsequence ‘N #N V #V’ and this subsequence is encoded at a ‘higher’ level by the pattern for a whole sentence, ‘S N #N V #V #S’.

In order to exploit this higher level encoding, we first add the symbols ‘S’ and ‘#S’ (representing the sentence pattern) to the word-level encoding giving ‘S N 0 #N V 1 #V #S’. Then we extract the subsequence ‘N #N V #V’ (which is implied by the symbols ‘S’ and ‘#S’, representing a sentence) so that the net result is ‘S 0 1 #S’. It should be clear that, in the context of the grammar shown in Figure 3, these four symbols unambiguously encode the original sentence, ‘j o h n r u n s’. In terms of numbers of symbols (and in terms of the numbers of bits, calculated by SP61), this is substantially shorter than the original.

This idea of using ‘higher level’ patterns to encode the codes from ‘lower level’ patterns may be applied recursively through any number of levels. More realistic examples may be found in [Wolff 98d1].

The method used in SP61 for calculating a measure of the compression associated with any alignment delivers a value called a *compression difference* (CD). This is the size of New without any compression minus the size of New after it has been encoded in terms of the alignment.

3.4 The SP61 model

There is no space here to present anything more than a general description of the SP61 model. A summary of the organisation of the model is presented in [Wolff 98a]. SP61 is similar to the SP52 model described quite fully in [Wolff 98d1]. The main difference between SP61 and the earlier model is that SP61 has been generalised to calculate probabilities of inferences. In addition, a fairly large number of minor refinements have been made.

At the heart of both models is a process for finding alignments between two patterns which are ‘good’ in terms of IC. An early version of this method for aligning two patterns is described in [Wolff 95b] and a more refined version in [Wolff 94a].

The process may be regarded as a form of dynamic programming (see, for example, [Sankoff and Kruskal 83]) but it differs from standard methods in three main ways:

- It can find alternative alignments between two patterns, graded in terms

of compression.

- It exploits list processing techniques so that arbitrarily long patterns may be compared (within the limits of the host machine).
- The thoroughness of searching, and thus the computational resources which are required (computing time or memory size or both), may be controlled with parameters.

For each pattern in New (and there is normally only one), this process is applied initially to compare the pattern in New with all the patterns in Old. From amongst the alignments which are found, the best ones are ‘unified’ to convert the alignment into a single sequence or pattern of symbols. This pattern is stored together with the alignment from which it was derived. Any alignments which cannot be unified in this way are discarded.

For each pattern amongst the best of the unified alignments just formed, the process is repeated, the best alignments are unified to form simple patterns and these patterns (with their alignments) are stored as before. This cycle is repeated in the same way until no more alignments can be found.

3.4.1 Computational complexity

Given that all the example grammars in this article are smaller than would be required in any realistic system, and given the well-known computational demands of multiple alignment problems, readers may reasonably ask whether the proposed framework for parsing would scale up to handle realistically large knowledge structures and patterns in New.

The time complexity of the SP52 model in a serial processing environment has been estimated to be approximately $O(\log_2 n \cdot nm)$, where n is the length of the sentence and m is the sum of the lengths of the patterns in Old [Wolff 98d1]. The same estimate is valid for the SP61 model. In a parallel processing environment, the time complexity of the models may approach $O(\log_2 n \cdot n)$, depending on how the parallel processing is applied. In serial or parallel environments, the space complexity should be $O(m)$.

In summary, there is reason to think that the method of forming alignments which is embodied in SP61 will not lead to running times or demands for storage which are hopelessly impractical when the this approach is applied to realistically large examples.

3.4.2 Alignments with one-dimensional patterns

As was indicated in Section 2.1, it is envisaged that the ICMAUS concepts will, at some stage, be generalised to accommodate patterns in two or more dimensions. However, at present, the SP52 and SP61 models are restricted to one-dimensional patterns.

One consequence of this restriction is that it is necessary, with any given alignment, to be able to ‘project’ it into a single sequence as was shown in

Section 3.2. This can only be done if the left-right position of every symbol in the alignment is unambiguous. With alignments like these:

```

a   b           a b
|   |           | |
a x b   and   a b x
|   |           | |
a y b           a b y

```

the relative left-right positions of ‘x’ and ‘y’ are not defined which means that the alignments cannot be projected into a single sequence. In the SP52 and SP61 models, all such alignments are ‘illegal’ and are discarded.

When the models are generalised to handle patterns in two (or more) dimensions, there should be some relaxation in the restriction just described. For example, if the left-right position of ‘x’ and ‘y’ is undefined in a time dimension, it should still be possible to accept the alignment provided that ‘x’ and ‘y’ were at two different positions in a spatial dimension.

Another possible way to avoid this restriction might be to generalise the models so that, when appropriate, the symbols in each pattern may be treated as an unordered collection or ‘bag’. Since order is no longer significant, alignments like the ones shown above should be legal. No attempt has yet been made to generalise the models in this way.

4 Probabilistic reasoning, multiple alignment and information compression

What connection is there between the formation of an alignment, as described in Section 3.2, and PR? This section describes the connection and describes in outline how the probabilities of inferences may be calculated. A fuller presentation, with more discussion of the method and the suppositions on which it is based, may be found in [Wolff 98b].

In the simplest terms, PR arises from partial pattern recognition: if a pattern is recognised from a subset of its parts (something that humans and animals are very good at doing), then, in effect, an inference is made that the unseen part or parts are ‘really’ there. We might, for example, recognise a car from seeing only the front half because the rear half is hidden behind another car or a building. The inference that the rear half is present is probabilistic because there is always a possibility that the rear half is absent or, in some surreal world, replaced by the front half of a horse, and so on.

In terms of multiple alignment, PR may be understood as the formation of an alignment in which some part or parts of the patterns from Old which appear in the alignment (single symbols, substrings or subsequences within patterns from Old) are not aligned with any matching symbol or symbols from New. As a working hypothesis, all kinds of PR may be understood in these terms.

What connection is there between the probability of any inferences which may appear in an alignment and measures of compression for that alignment?

How can the probability of MA inferences be calculated? Answers to these two questions are presented next. Although the example to be shown is simple, the method to be outlined is general and may be applied to alignments of any complexity.

4.1 Absolute probabilities of alignments and inferences

Any sequence of L symbols, drawn from an alphabet of $|A|$ symbol types, represents one point in a set of N points where N is calculated as:

$$N = |A|^L.$$

If we assume that the sequence is random or nearly so, which means that the N points are equi-probable or nearly so, the probability of any one point (which represents a sequence of length L) is reasonably close to:

$$p_{ABS} = |A|^{-L}.$$

This formula can be used to calculate the probability of a New sequence in an alignment after it has been compressed in terms of the Old patterns in the alignment: the formula is applied with the value of L being the length of the New after encoding. In SP61, the value of $|A|$ is 2.

If New is not completely matched by symbols in Old, we can use the formula to calculate the probability of that substring or subsequence within New which is matched to symbols in Old. This probability may also be regarded as a probability both of the alignment and of any inferences (symbols from Old which are not matched to New) within the alignment.

4.1.1 Is it reasonable to assume that New in encoded form is random or nearly so?

Why should we assume that the code for an alignment is a random sequence or nearly so? In accordance with Algorithmic Information Theory (see, for example, [Li and Vitányi 97]), a sequence is random if it is incompressible. If we have reason to believe that a sequence is incompressible or nearly so, then we may regard it as random or nearly so.

Generally, we cannot prove for any given body of data that no further compression is possible. But we may say that, with the methods we are currently using, and the resources we have applied, no further compression can be achieved. In short, the assumption that the code for an alignment is random or nearly so only applies to the best encodings found for a given body of information in New and must be qualified by the quality and thoroughness of the search methods which have been used to create the code.

4.2 Relative probabilities of alignments

The absolute probabilities of alignments, calculated as described in the last subsection, are normally very small and not very interesting in themselves. From

the standpoint of practical applications, we are normally interested in the *relative* values of probabilities, not their *absolute* values.

A point we may note in passing is that the calculation of relative probabilities from p_{ABS} will tend to cancel out any general tendency for values of p_{ABS} to be too high or too low. Any systematic bias in values of p_{ABS} should not have much effect on the values which are of most interest to us.

If we are to compare one alignment and its probability to another alignment and its probability, *we need to compare like with like*. An alignment can have a high value for p_{ABS} because it encodes only one or two symbols from New. It is not reasonable to compare an alignment like that to another alignment which has a lower value for p_{ABS} but which encodes more symbols from New. Consequently, the procedure for calculating relative values for probabilities (p_{REL}) is as follows:

1. For the alignment which has the highest CD (which we shall call the *reference alignment*), identify the symbols from New which are encoded by the alignment. We will call these symbols the *reference set* of symbols in New.
2. Compile a *reference set* of alignments *which includes the alignment with the highest CD and all other alignments (if any) which encode exactly the reference set of symbols from New, neither more nor less.*⁹
3. The alignments in the reference set are examined to find and remove any rows which are redundant in the sense that all the symbols appearing in a given row also appear in another row in the same order.¹⁰ Any alignment which, after editing, matches another alignment in the set is removed from the set.
4. Calculate the sum of the values for p_{ABS} in the reference set of alignments:

$$p_{A_SUM} = \sum_{i=1}^{i=R} p_{ABS_i}$$

where R is the size of the reference set of alignments and p_{ABS_i} is the value of p_{ABS} for the i th alignment in the reference set.

5. For each alignment in the reference set, calculate its relative probability as:

$$p_{REL_i} = p_{ABS_i} / p_{A_SUM}.$$

⁹There may be a case for defining the reference set of alignments as those alignments which encode the reference set of symbols *or any super-set of that set*. It is not clear at present which of those two definitions is to be preferred.

¹⁰If Old is well compressed, this kind of redundancy amongst the rows of an alignment should not appear very often.

The values of p_{REL} calculated as just described seem to provide an effective means of comparing the alignments which encode the same set of symbols from New as the alignment which has the best overall CD.

It is not necessary always to use the alignment with the best CD as the basis of the reference set of symbols. It may happen that some other set of symbols from New is the focus of interest. In this case a different reference set of alignments may be constructed and relative values for those alignments may be calculated as described above.

4.3 Relative probabilities of patterns and symbols

It often happens that a given pattern from Old or a given symbol type within patterns from Old appears in more than one of the alignments in the reference set. In cases like these, one would expect the relative probability of the pattern or symbol type to be higher than if it appeared in only one alignment. To take account of this kind of situation, SP61 calculates relative probabilities for individual patterns and symbol types in the following way:

1. Compile a set of patterns from Old, each of which appears at least once in the reference set of alignments.
2. For each pattern, calculate a value for its relative probability as the sum of the p_{REL} values for the alignments in which it appears. If a pattern appears more than once in an alignment, it is only counted once for that alignment.
3. Compile a set of symbol types which appear anywhere in the patterns identified in 2.
4. For each symbol type identified in 3, calculate its relative probability as the sum of the relative probabilities of the patterns in which it appears. If it appears more than once in a given pattern, it is only counted once. With regard to symbol types, the foregoing applies only to symbol types which do not appear in New. Any symbol type which appears in New necessarily has a probability of 1.0 - because it has been observed, not inferred.

4.4 A simple example

In order to illustrate the kinds of values which may be calculated for absolute and relative probabilities, this subsection presents a very simple example: the inference of 'fire' from 'smoke'. Here, we shall extend the concept of 'smoke' to include anything, like mist or fog, which looks like smoke. Also, 'fire' has been divided into three categories: the kind of fire used to heat a house or other building, dangerous fires that need a fire extinguisher or more, and the kind of fire inside a burning cigarette or pipe. The alignment we are considering looks like this:

| <i>Patterns</i> | <i>Frequency</i> | <i>Encoding cost (bits)</i> |
|----------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|
| clouds black rain | 15,000 | 2.93 |
| dangerous fire smoke | 500 | 7.84 |
| heating fire smoke | 7,000 | 4.03 |
| tobacco fire smoke | 10,000 | 3.52 |
| fog smoke | 2,000 | 5.84 |
| stage smoke | 100 | 10.16 |
| thunder lightning | 5,000 | 4.52 |
| strawberries cream | 1,500 | 6.26 |

Table 2: A small knowledge base of associations. The middle column shows an imaginary frequency of occurrence of each pattern in some notional reference environment. The right-hand column shows the encoding cost of each pattern, calculated as described in Section 4 of [Wolff 98d1].

```

smoke
 |
fire smoke

```

Given the small knowledge base shown in Table 2 as Old, and a pattern containing the single symbol ‘smoke’ as New, the frequency of occurrence and the ‘minimum’ cost of each symbol type (calculated by SP61 using the method described in Section 4 of [Wolff 98d1]) are shown in Table 3.

The encoding cost of each pattern is simply the sum of the minimum costs of each of the minimum number of symbols from the pattern which are needed to discriminate the pattern uniquely within Old (as described in Section 4 of [Wolff 98d1]). In this example, every pattern can be identified uniquely by its first symbol. Thus, in all cases, the encoding cost of each pattern (shown to the right of Table 2) is the minimum cost of its first symbol.

Given that New is a pattern containing the single symbol ‘smoke’, SP61 forms the five obvious alignments of New with each of the patterns in Table 2 which contain the symbol ‘smoke’. The absolute and relative probabilities of the five alignments, calculated as described above, are shown in Table 4.

In this very simple example, the relative probability of each pattern from Old is the same as for the alignment in which it appears. However, the same cannot be said of individual symbol types. The relative probabilities of the symbol types that appear in any of the five reference alignments (shown in Table 4) are shown in Table 5.

The main points to notice about the relative probabilities shown in Table 5 are:

- The relative probability of ‘smoke’ is 1.0. This is because it is a ‘fact’ which appears in New: hence there is no uncertainty attaching to it.

| | <i>Frequency</i> | <i>Minimum cost (bits)</i> |
|--------------|------------------|--------------------------------|
| smoke | 19,601 | 2.55 |
| black | 15,000 | 2.93 |
| clouds | 15,000 | 2.93 |
| cream | 1,500 | 6.26 |
| dangerous | 500 | 7.84 |
| fire | 17,500 | 2.71 |
| fog | 2,000 | 5.84 |
| heating | 7,000 | 4.03 |
| lightning | 5,000 | 4.52 |
| rain | 15,000 | 2.93 |
| stage | 100 | 10.16 |
| strawberries | 1,500 | 6.26 |
| thunder | 5,000 | 4.52 |
| tobacco | 10,000 | 3.52 |

Table 3: The frequency of occurrence of each symbol type appearing in Table 2 (together with New which is a pattern containing the single symbol ‘smoke’) and the minimum cost of each symbol type calculated by the method described in Section 4 of [Wolff 98d1].

| | <i>Absolute probability</i> | <i>Relative probability</i> |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| smoke/tobacco fire smoke | 0.08718 | 0.51020 |
| smoke/heating fire smoke | 0.06103 | 0.35714 |
| smoke/fog smoke | 0.01744 | 0.10204 |
| smoke/dangerous fire smoke | 0.00436 | 0.02551 |
| smoke/stage smoke | 0.00009 | 0.00510 |

Table 4: Absolute and relative probabilities of each of the five reference alignments formed between ‘smoke’ in New and, in Old, the patterns shown in Table 2. In this example, the relative probability of each pattern from Old is the same as the alignment in which it appears.

| | <i>Relative probability</i> |
|-----------|---------------------------------|
| smoke | 1.00000 |
| fire | 0.89286 |
| tobacco | 0.51020 |
| heating | 0.35714 |
| fog | 0.10204 |
| dangerous | 0.02551 |
| stage | 0.00510 |

Table 5: The relative probabilities of the symbol types from Old that appear in any of the reference set of alignments shown in Table 4.

- Of the other symbol types from Old, the one with the highest probability relative to the other symbols is ‘fire’, and this relative probability is higher than the relative probability of any of the patterns from Old (Table 4). This is because ‘fire’ appears in three of the reference alignments.

In this example, we have ignored all the subtle cues that people would use in practice to infer the origin of smoke: the smell, colour and volume of smoke, associated noises, behaviour of other people, and so on. Allowing for this, and allowing for the probable inaccuracy of the frequency values which have been used, the relative probabilities of alignments, patterns and symbols seem to reflect the subjective probability which we might assign to the five alternative sources of smoke-like matter in everyday situations.

5 Best-match pattern recognition and information retrieval

As was noted in Section 4, recognition of objects or patterns can entail PR when a pattern is recognised from a subset of its parts. The same is true of best-match information retrieval. In both cases, there can be errors of omission, addition and substitution.

As an example of best-match pattern recognition (which may also be construed as best-match information retrieval), consider the thoroughly mis-spelled ‘word’, ‘c m p u x t a r’ and how it may be matched against stored patterns. Figure 5 shows the four alignments formed by SP61 which have the highest CDs when this pattern was supplied as New and, in Old, a small dictionary of 45 words prepared by selecting, in a more or less haphazard manner, one, two or three words from each of the alphabetic sections of an ordinary English dictionary. Each word was given a notional frequency of occurrence.

The first three alignments are, by far, the best matches for the given pattern. They have CDs (from the top alignment downwards) of 41.39, 29.14 and 28.44. The next best alignment is the fourth one shown in Figure 5, which has a CD of

```

0 c m p u x t a r 0
  | | | | | |
1 c o m p u t e r 1

```

(a)

```

0 c m p u x t a r 0
  | | | | |
1 c o m m u t e r 1

```

(b)

```

0 c m p u x t a r 0
  | | | | |
1 c o m m u t e r 1

```

(c)

```

0 c m p u x t a r 0
  | | | |
1 p a r a f f i n 1

```

(d)

Figure 5: The best four alignments formed by SP61 between ‘c m p u x t a r’ and words in a small dictionary of 45 words. CD values for the four alignments are, from the top down, 41.39, 29.14, 28.44 and 13.76.

only 13.76. Notice that each of the first three alignments contain discrepancies between ‘c m p u x t a r’ and the word to which it has been aligned which represent all three of the possible kinds of discrepancy: omission, addition and substitution of symbols.

Regarding probabilities, the absolute probability of the best alignment is calculated by SP61 as 0.00652. Since there is no other alignment which contains all and only the symbols ‘c’, ‘m’, ‘p’, ‘u’, ‘t’ and ‘r’ from New, the reference list of alignments containing all and only the same symbols from New has only one entry, and so the relative probability of the best alignment is 1.0.

In general, these results accord with our intuition that the ‘correct’ form of ‘c m p u x t a r’ is ‘c o m p u t e r’ and our intuition that ‘c o m m u t e r’ is a very close alternative.

6 Inheritance of attributes in a class hierarchy

In describing objects, patterns or other entities it is often useful to assign them to classes which may themselves be classified recursively through any number of levels. This, of course, is the basis of object-oriented software and object-oriented databases. The value of a classification system is that it saves repetition of features which are the same in two or more entities. Many animals, for example, have a backbone. If these animals are grouped into a class ‘vertebrates’ then the feature ‘backbone’ need only be recorded once in the description of the class and it can then be *inherited* by members of the class without the need to record it in each of the several descriptions of individual animals. This device is a mechanism for information compression.

Figure 6 shows a set of patterns representing, in highly simplified form, part of a class hierarchy for vertebrate animals. As in Figure 3, each pattern is followed by a number in brackets which represents a notional frequency of occurrence of the pattern in some domain.

The first pattern represents the class vertebrates and is mainly a framework for lower-level classes. It provides empty slots for ‘name’, ‘head’, ‘legs’, ‘blood’ and others, while the slot for ‘body’ shows that each vertebrate has a backbone.

Below the pattern for vertebrates - lower on the page and lower in terms of the class hierarchy - are patterns for reptiles, birds and mammals. Each one is identified as a vertebrate and each one shows distinctive features for its class: reptiles are cold-blooded, birds have feathers, and so on. In a similar way, three subclasses of the class mammal are specified and, within one of those subclasses (the class ‘carnivore’), there is a pattern for each of the classes ‘dog’ and ‘cat’. In each case, the pattern for a given class is linked to its ‘parent’ class by inclusion in the pattern of the name of the parent class.

Figure 7 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘description name Tibs #name purrs #description’ in New and, in Old, the patterns shown in Figure 6. Each of the symbols from Figure 6 has been abbreviated in Figure 7 so that the alignment does not become too long to be shown easily on a page.

```

vertebrate description name #name head #head
  body backbone #body
  legs #legs blood #blood
  covering #covering food #food
  other_features #other_features
  #description #vertebrate (104700)
vertebrate reptile description blood cold #blood
  covering scaly #covering
  #description #reptile #vertebrate (35000)
vertebrate bird description head beak #head
  blood warm #blood
  covering feathers #covering
  #description #bird #vertebrate (40000)
vertebrate mammal description
  blood warm #blood covering fur #covering
  #description #mammal #vertebrate (29700)
mammal marsupial description
  other_features born_small#other_features
  #description #marsupial #mammal (700)
mammal cetacean description
  other_features
    fish_shape live_in_water
  #other_features
  #description #cetacean #mammal (15000)
mammal carnivore description food flesh_eating #food
  #description #carnivore #mammal (1400)
carnivore cat description
  other_features
    retractile_claws purrs
  #other_features
  #description #cat #carnivore (600)
carnivore dog description
  other_features barks #other_features
  #description #dog #carnivore (800)

```

Figure 6: A set of patterns representing part of a class hierarchy of vertebrate animals, much simplified. The number in brackets at the end of each pattern is a notional frequency of occurrence of that pattern.

6.1 Inferences with less distinctive features

What happens if the symbols in New are not so distinctive for one of the lowest-level classes? SP61 has been run with the same patterns in Old but with the pattern ‘description name Tibs #name flesh_eating #description’ in New. In this case, the program forms three alignments which match with all the symbols in New (except ‘Tibs’). The best one in terms of compression is like the alignment in Figure 7 except that it does not include a pattern for the class ‘cat’. In effect, it identifies the unknown animal as a carnivore without specifying what kind of carnivore. The other two alignments are the same except that, in addition, one contains the pattern for ‘dog’ and the other contains the pattern for ‘cat’.

The SP61 program calculates relative probabilities for the three alignments as 0.915, 0.062 and 0.023, respectively. From these values, the program calculates probabilities for individual patterns and symbols in the alignments.

Since the pattern for ‘carnivore’ appears in all three alignments, its probability is calculated as the sum of the three relative probabilities - which is 1.0. Likewise for the patterns for ‘mammal’ and ‘vertebrate’. However, the pattern for ‘dog’ appears in only one of the three alignments so the probability is the same as the relative probability for that alignment: 0.062. In a similar way, the probability for the pattern for ‘cat’ is 0.023. Similar calculations are made for symbols in the alignments.

The probability value of 1.0 for ‘carnivore’, ‘mammal’ and ‘vertebrate’ reflects our intuition that, in terms of the patterns in Old, the unknown animal is certainly a carnivore and also a mammal and a vertebrate. But the relative probabilities for ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ seem rather low.

A possible refinement of the method of calculating probabilities might be for the system to recognise that the first alignment is contained within each of the second and third alignments so that a relative probability may be calculated for each of the second and third alignments, in each case excluding the probability of the first alignment. If the calculations are done in this way, the relative probability of ‘dog’ would be 0.729 and the relative probability of ‘cat’ would be 0.271. These values accord much better with our intuitions.

7 One-step ‘deductive’ reasoning

Consider a ‘standard’ example of *modus ponens* syllogistic reasoning:

1. $\forall x: \text{bird}(x) \Rightarrow \text{canfly}(x)$.
2. $\text{bird}(\text{Tweety})$.
3. $\therefore \text{canfly}(\text{Tweety})$.

which, in English, may be interpreted as:

1. If something is a bird then that something can fly.

2. Tweety is a bird.
3. Therefore, Tweety can fly.

In strict logic, a ‘material implication’ like $(p \Rightarrow q)$ (“If something is a bird then that something can fly”) is equivalent to $(\neg q \Rightarrow \neg p)$ (“If something cannot fly then it is not a bird”) and also to $(\neg p \Rightarrow q)$ (“Either something is not a bird or it can fly”).

However, there is a more relaxed, ‘everyday’ kind of ‘deduction’ which, in terms of our example, may be expressed as: “If something is a bird then, *probably*, it can fly. Tweety is a bird. Therefore, *probably*, Tweety can fly.”

This kind of probabilistic ‘deduction’ differs from strict material implication because it does not have the same equivalencies as the strict form. If our focus of interest is in describing and reasoning about the real world (rather than exploring the properties of abstract systems of symbols), the probabilistic kind of ‘deduction’ seems to be more appropriate. With regard to birds, we know that there are flightless birds, and for most other examples of a similar kind, an “all or nothing” logical description would not be an accurate reflection of the facts.

With a pattern of symbols, we may record the fact that birds can fly and, in a very natural way, we may record all the other attributes of a bird in the same pattern. The pattern may look something like this:

```
bird name #name canfly wings feathers beak
crop lays_eggs ... #bird
```

or the attributes of a bird may be described in the more elaborate way described in Section 6.

This pattern and others of a similar kind may be stored in ‘Old’, together with patterns like ‘name Tweety #name’, ‘name Tweety #name’, ‘name Susan #name’ and so on which define the range of possible names. Also, the pattern, ‘bird Tweety’, corresponding to the proposition “Tweety is a bird” may be supplied as New. Given patterns like these in New and Old, the best alignment found by SP61 is the one shown in Figure 8.

As before, the inferences which are expressed by this alignment are represented by the unmatched symbols in the alignment. The fact that Tweety is a bird allows us to infer that Tweety can fly but it also allows us to infer that Tweety has wings, feathers and all the other attributes of birds. These inferences arise directly from the pattern describing the attributes of birds.

There is only one alignment which encodes all the symbols in New. Therefore, the relative probability of the alignment is 1.0, the relative probability of ‘canfly’ is 1.0, and likewise for all the other symbols in the alignment, both those which are matched to New and those which are not.¹²

¹²At this point readers may wonder whether the ICMAUS scheme can handle nonmonotonic reasoning: the fact that additional information about penguins, kiwis and other flightless birds would invalidate the inference that something being a bird means that it can fly. Discussion of this point is deferred until Section 11

```

0 bird      Tweety      0
  |         |
1 |   name Tweety #name  1
  |   |         |
2 bird name      #name canfly wings feathers beak 2

0                               0

1                               1

2 crop lays_eggs ... #bird 2

```

Figure 8: The best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘bird Tweety’ in New and other patterns in Old as described in the text.

8 Abductive reasoning

In the ICMAUS framework, any subsequence of a pattern may function as what is ‘given’ in reasoning, with the complementary subsequence functioning as the inference. Thus, it is just as easy to reason in a ‘backwards’, abductive manner as it is to reason in a ‘forwards’, deductive manner. We can also reason from the middle of a pattern outwards, from the ends of a pattern to the middle, and many other possibilities. In short, the ICMAUS framework allows seamless integration of probabilistic ‘deductive’ reasoning with abductive reasoning and other kinds of reasoning which are not commonly recognised.

Figure 9 shows the best alignment and the other member of its reference set of alignments which are formed by SP61 with the same patterns in Old as were used in the example of ‘deductive’ reasoning (Section 7) and with the pattern ‘Tweety canfly’ in New.

By contrast with the example of ‘deductive’ reasoning, there are two alignments in the reference set of alignments that encode all the symbols in New. These two alignments represent two alternative sets of abductive inferences that may be drawn from this combination of New and Old.

With regard to the first alignment (Figure 9 (a)), ‘Tweety’ could be a bird with all the attributes of birds, including the ability to fly. The relative probability of the alignment is 0.8, as is the relative probability of the pattern for ‘bird’ and every other symbol in that pattern (apart from the ‘name’ and ‘#name’ symbols where the relative probability is 1.0).

Alternatively, we may infer from the second alignment (Figure 9 (b)) that ‘Tweety’ could be a bat. But in this case the relative probability of the alignment, the pattern for ‘bat’ and all the symbols in that pattern (apart from the ‘name #name’ symbols) is only 0.2.

```

0          Tweety          canfly          0
          |                |
1      name Tweety #name |          1
          |                |
2 bird name          #name canfly wings feathers beak 2

```

```

0          0
1          1
2 crop lays_eggs ... #bird 2

```

(a)

```

0          Tweety          canfly          0
          |                |
1      name Tweety #name |          1
          |                |
2 bat name          #name fur canfly eats_insects ... #bat 2

```

(b)

Figure 9: The best alignment and the other member of its reference set of alignments which are formed by SP61 with patterns as described in Section 7 in Old and ‘Tweety canfly’ in New.

```

Start 1 Does the starter turn the engine? (3600)
  1 yes 2 Does the starter turn the engine briskly? (2400)
    2 yes 6 Does the engine start? (1900)
      6 yes 10 Does the engine run smoothly? (700)
        10 yes 14 Engine is OK. (500)
          10 no 12 Replace the carburettor. (200)
        6 no 11 Is there fuel in the tank? (1200)
          11 yes 12 Replace the carburettor. (300)
            11 no 13 Put fuel in the tank. (900)
          2 no 15 Is the battery flat? (500)
            15 yes 4 Recharge or replace the battery. (400)
              15 no 16 Replace the starter motor. (100)
            1 no 3 Is the battery flat? (1200)
              3 yes 4 Recharge or replace the battery. (800)
                3 no 5 Are there good electrical connections? (400)
                  5 yes 8 Are the spark plugs OK? (300)
                    8 yes 17 Replace the starter motor. (100)
                      8 no 18 Replace the spark plugs. (200)
                    5 no 9 Repair the electrical connections. (100)

```

Figure 10: A set of patterns representing a highly simplified decision network for the diagnosis of faults in car engines. As in other examples of patterns in this paper, each pattern has a notional frequency of occurrence which is shown in brackets at the end of the pattern. The English text associated with each pattern is not part of the patterns as they are supplied to SP61.

9 Reasoning with probabilistic decision networks and decision trees

Figure 10 shows a set of patterns which, in effect, represent a (highly simplified) decision network for the diagnosis of faults in car engines. As with other sets of patterns shown in this paper, each pattern has a notional frequency of occurrence shown in brackets at the end of the pattern. The patterns supplied to SP61 do not include the English text shown in the figure.

It should be clear that patterns like the ones shown in Figure 10 may be used to represent either a decision network or a decision tree. The set of patterns in the figure correspond very largely to a tree structure but, strictly speaking, the structure is a network because terminal node 12 can be reached via two different paths, and likewise for terminal node 4.

Figure 11 shows the best alignment formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘Start no no yes no’ in New (representing a sequence of yes/no decisions in the network) and, in Old, the patterns shown in Figure 10 (without the English text). The key inference we can make from this alignment is the numerical identifier ‘18’ at the extreme right of the figure. This corresponds to the advice “Replace the spark plugs”.




Figure 11: The best alignment formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘Start no no yes no’ in New and the patterns shown in Figure 10 in Old (without the English text).

Since there is only one alignment which matches all the symbols in New, the probability of the inference in this case is 1.0. If the sequence of symbols in New is incomplete in some way, e.g., the last symbol (‘no’) is missing, the program delivers a set of alternative alignments with probabilities less than 1.0 in much the same way as in the example discussed in Section 5.

9.1 So what?

Regarding the example in Figure 11, readers may object that ICMAUS is a long-winded way to achieve something which is done perfectly adequately with a conventional expert system or even a conventional chart on paper. Has anything been gained by re-casting the example in an unfamiliar form?

The main reason for including the example in this article is to show that multiple alignment as it has been developed in the ICMAUS framework has a much broader scope than may, at first sight, be assumed. However, one possible advantage of using the ICMAUS framework is that it is generic for several different kinds of PR and so can promote the integration of decision networks and trees with other kinds of PR.

Another possible response to the “So what?” question is that the ICMAUS framework, unlike most conventional discrimination nets or discrimination trees, does not depend exclusively on input which is both complete and accurate. It can bridge gaps in information supplied to it (as New) and can compensate for symbols which have been added or substituted in the input, provided there are not too many. There is an example with discussion in [Wolff 98b].

10 Reasoning with ‘rules’

The rules in a typical expert system express associations between things in the form ‘IF condition THEN consequence (or action)’. As we saw with the example in Section 4.4, we can express an association quite simply as a pattern like ‘fire smoke’ without the need to make a formal distinction between the ‘condition’ and the ‘consequence’ or ‘action’. And, as we saw in Sections 7 and 8, it is possible to use patterns like these quite freely in both a ‘forwards’ and a ‘backwards’ direction. As was noted in Section 8, the ICMAUS framework allows inferences to be drawn from patterns in a totally flexible way: any subsequence of the symbols in a pattern may function as a condition, with the complementary subsequence as the corresponding inference.

It is easy to form a chain of inference like “If A then B, if B then C” from patterns like ‘A B’ and ‘B C’. But if the patterns are ‘A B’ and ‘C B’, the relative positions of ‘A’ and ‘C’ in the alignment are undefined as described in Section 3.4.2. This means that, with the SP52 or SP61 models, the alignment is treated as being illegal and is discarded. Generalisations of the models as described in Section 8 would probably provide a solution to this problem but these generalisations have not yet been attempted.

A way round this problem which can be used with the current models is to adopt a convention that the symbols in every pattern are arranged in some arbitrary sequence, e.g., alphabetical, and to include a ‘framework’ pattern and some additional ‘service’ symbols which together have the effect of ensuring that every symbol type always has a column to itself. This avoids the kind of problem described above and allows patterns to be treated as if they were unordered associations of symbols.

Figure 12 shows a small set of patterns representing well-known associations together with one pattern (‘3 destroy 4 10 the_barn 11’) representing the fact that ‘the barn’ has been destroy(ed) and a framework pattern (‘1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11’) as mentioned above. In every pattern except the last, the alphabetic symbols are arranged in alphabetical order. Every alphabetical symbol has its own slot in the framework, e.g. ‘black-clouds’ has been assigned to the position between the service symbols ‘1’ and ‘2’. Every alphabetical symbol is flanked by the service symbols representing its slot.

Figure 13 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘accused petrol smoke the-barn’ in New and the patterns from Figure 12 in Old. The pattern in New may be taken to represent the key points in an allegation that an accused person has been seen with petrol near ‘the-barn’ (which has been destroyed) and that smoke was seen at the same time.

The alleged facts about the accused person do not, in themselves, show that he/she is guilty of arson. For the jury to find the accused person guilty, they must understand the connections between the accused person, petrol, smoke and the destruction of the barn. With this example, the inferences are so simple (for people) that the prosecuting lawyer would hardly need to spell them out. But the inferences still need to be made.

The alignment shown in Figure 13 may be interpreted as a piecing together

```

4 fire 5 8 smoke 9 (500)
3 destroy 4 fire 5 (100)
4 fire 5 matches 6 petrol 7 (300)
1 black-clouds 2 7 rain 8 (2000)
1 black-clouds 2 cold 3 9 snow 10 (1000)
3 destroy 4 10 the-barn 11 (1)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 (7000)

```

Figure 12: Patterns in Old representing well-known associations, together with one ‘fact’ (‘3 destroy 4 10 the-barn 11’) and a ‘framework’ pattern (‘1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11’) as described in the text.

```

0          accused petrol smoke the-barn 0
          |         |     |         |
1      4 fire 5 matches 6 petrol 7     |     |     1
          | | |         |         |     |     |
2      3 destroy 4 fire 5         |     |     |     |     2
          | | |         |         |     |     |     |
3 1 2 3     | 4 | 5         6     7 8 | 9 10 | 11 3
          | | |         |         |     |     |     |
4      3 destroy | | |         |     |     | 10 the-barn 11 4
          | | |         |         |     |     |
5          4 fire 5         8 smoke 9         5

```

Figure 13: The best alignment formed by SP61 with a pattern in New representing allegations about someone accused of arson and patterns in Old as shown in Figure 12.

of the argument that the petrol, with matches or something similar (that were not seen), was used to start a fire (which was not seen either), and that the fire explains why smoke was seen and why the barn was destroyed. Of course, in a more realistic example, there would be many other clues to the existence of a fire (e.g., charred wood) but the example, as shown, gives an indication of the way in which evidence and inferences may be connected together in the ICMAUS paradigm.

11 Nonmonotonic reasoning and reasoning with default values for variables

The concepts of *monotonic* and *nonmonotonic* reasoning are well explained by [Ginsberg 94]. In brief, conventional deductive inference is *monotonic* because, as your set of beliefs grows, so does the set of conclusions that can be drawn from those beliefs. The deduction that “Socrates is mortal” from the propositions that “All humans are mortal” and “Socrates is human” remains true for all time and cannot be invalidated by anything we learn later. By contrast, the inference that “Tweety can probably fly” from the propositions that “Most birds fly” and “Tweety is a bird” is *nonmonotonic* because it may be changed if, for example, we learn that Tweety is a penguin (unless he/she is an astonishing new kind of penguin that can fly).

This section presents some simple examples which suggest that the ICMAUS framework may provide a ‘home’ for nonmonotonic reasoning. No attempt is made to address the several problems associated with nonmonotonic reasoning which are described in [Ginsberg 94].

11.1 Typically, birds fly

Figure 14 shows a set of patterns like the patterns describing animals that we saw in Figure 6 but adapted to illustrate nonmonotonic reasoning. The main points to notice in this connection are that the set of patterns includes one for the class ‘bird’ and one each for ‘swallow’ and ‘penguin’. Also, the set of patterns in Figure 14 contains the pattern ‘bird canfly yes #canfly #bird’.

This last-mentioned pattern provides a ‘default value’ for the variable ‘canfly #canfly’ in the class ‘bird’. The context ‘bird ... #bird’ is included in the pattern so that the default value applies only to birds and allows for the possibility that a different default value for the same variable might apply in the case of, say, insects.

The pattern ‘bird canfly yes #canfly #bird’ may be interpreted as a statement that “Typically, birds fly”. It should not be interpreted as the universally-quantified statement that “All birds fly” because, as will be seen below, it can be over-ridden in much the same way as default values in conventional systems.

Elsewhere [Wolff 98d1] I have discussed how a universal truth may be expressed using patterns. In brief, the pattern ‘bird canfly yes #canfly #bird’ should be removed from Old and the pattern defining the class birds should

```

bird description
    name #name
    structure
        wings #wings
        feathers beak crop
    #structure
    function canfly #canfly lays_eggs #function
#description #bird (30000)
bird swallow description
    wings pointed #wings
    canfly yes #canfly
#description #swallow #bird (700)
bird penguin description
    wings stubby #wings
    canfly no #canfly
#description #penguin #bird (400)
bird canfly yes #canfly #bird (15000)
name Tweety #name (300)
name John #name(500)
name Tibby #name (400)

```

Figure 14: A set of patterns to illustrate nonmonotonic reasoning.

be augmented so that ‘canfly #canfly’ within the pattern becomes ‘canfly yes #canfly’.

11.2 Tweety is a bird so, probably, Tweety can fly

Figure 15 shows, at the top, the best alignment found by SP61 with the pattern ‘bird Tweety’ in New and the patterns from Figure 14 in Old. Below this alignment, in descending order of CDs, are the other alignments in the reference set. Relative probabilities of these alignments are shown in the caption to the figure.

The first alignment, which has by far the highest relative probability, tells us that, as a bird, Tweety almost certainly has wings, feathers, beak and a crop. In itself, this alignment does not tell us whether or not Tweety can fly. This accords with a ‘strict’ interpretation of the statement “Tweety is a bird”: because of the existence of flightless birds as well as birds that fly, this statement, in itself, does not tell us whether or not Tweety can fly.

However, the second alignment tells us, without supposing that Tweety is any particular type of bird, that it is more likely than anything else that Tweety can fly.

The last alignments in Figure 15 tell us that, in order of probability and within the limits imposed by the system’s store of knowledge, Tweety could be a swallow or a penguin. The alignments predict that, in the first case, Tweety would be able to fly, but not if he/she were a penguin.

Figure 15: (*This figure appears on the previous page.*) At the top of the figure, the best alignment found by SP61 for the pattern ‘bird Tweety’ in New with the patterns from Figure 14 in Old. Below that alignment, in descending order of CD values, are the other alignments in the reference set of alignments. *Key:* bd = bird, bk = beak, cp = crop, cy = canfly, dn = description, ee = eagle, fn = function, fs = feathers, ne = name, ls = lays_eggs, no = no, pd = pointed, pn = penguin, se = structure, sw = swallow, sy = stubby, Twy = Tweety, ve = vertebrate, ws = wings, ys = yes. In order from the top, the relative probabilities of these alignments are: 0.7636, 0.2094, 0.0172, and 0.0098.

11.3 Tweety is a penguin, so Tweety cannot fly

What happens if, when we have learned that Tweety is a bird and inferred that he/she can probably fly, we are then told that Tweety is a penguin? How, in the ICMAUS scheme, can we reason nonmonotonically, replacing our first inference with the new inference that Tweety cannot fly?

We must suppose that the information that Tweety is a bird (‘bird Tweety’) has been added to the patterns in Old which are shown in Figure 14. It is probably not appropriate to add anything to Old to say that Tweety can probably fly because this is merely inference, not fact. There may very well be a case for storing tentative inferences, and it seems likely that people do just that. But the intention in the design of SP61 is that Old will be restricted to information, in compressed or uncompressed form, which has, notionally at least, come from New.

Figure 16 shows the reference set of two alignments found by SP61 with the pattern ‘penguin Tweety’ in New and with Old augmented with ‘bird Tweety’ as just described. The first alignment tells us that Tweety is a bird that cannot fly because he/she is a penguin. The other alignment is the same but includes the pattern ‘bird Tweety’. Since both alignments tell us that Tweety cannot fly, the probability of this conclusion is 1.0, very much what one would naturally assume from the information that Tweety is a penguin.

Reasoning is nonmonotonic in this example because the previous conclusion that Tweety could probably fly has been replaced by the conclusion that Tweety cannot fly.

In this example, the formation of two alignments as shown in Figure 15 is somewhat untidy. As we noted in Section 5, there is probably a case for refining the system so that it can recognise when one alignment is contained within another. In this case, alignment (a) is contained within alignment (b) and is, in effect, a stepping stone in the formation of (b). There is a case for presenting alignment (b) by itself as the best alignment.

12 Solving geometric analogy problems

Figure 17 shows an example of a well-known type of simple puzzle - a geometric analogy problem. The task is to complete the relationship “A is to B as C is to

```

0   pn          Twy                                0
   |           |
1  bd pn dn    |          ws sy #ws              cy no #cy 1
   |   |     |   |          |   |              |   |
2  bd   dn ne  |   #ne se ws   #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy   #cy 2
   |       |   |   |
3           ne Twy #ne                                3

```

```

0                                0

1          #dn #pn #bd 1
           |     |
2  ls #fn #dn   #bd 2

3                                3

```

(a)

```

0   pn          Twy                                0
   |           |
1  bd pn dn    |          ws sy #ws              cy no #cy 1
   |   |     |   |          |   |              |   |
2  bd   dn ne  |   #ne se ws   #ws fs bk cp #se fn cy   #cy 2
   |       |   |   |
3  |           ne Twy #ne                                3
   |           |
4  bd          Twy                                4

```

```

0                                0

1          #dn #pn #bd 1
           |     |
2  ls #fn #dn   #bd 2

3                                3

4                                4

```

(b)

Figure 16: The best alignments found by SP61 with the pattern ‘penguin Tweety’ in New and with the patterns from Figure 14 in Old, augmented with the pattern ‘bird Tweety’. The abbreviations of symbols are the same as in Figure 15.




Figure 17: A geometric analogy problem.

?" using one of the figures 'D', 'E', 'F' or 'G' in the position marked with '?'. For this example, the 'correct' answer is clearly 'E'.

What has this got to do with PR? This kind of problem may be seen as an example of reasoning because it requires a process of "going beyond the information given". Is it probabilistic? In the example shown in Figure 17, there seems to be only one 'right' answer which does not seem to leave much room for probabilities less than 1.0. But with many problems of this type, a case can be made for two or even more alternative answers and there is a corresponding uncertainty about which answer is 'correct'.

Computer-based methods for solving this kind of problem have existed for some time (e.g., Evans's well-known heuristic algorithm [Evans 68]). In recent work [Belloti and Gammerman 96, Gammerman 91], MLE principles have been applied to good effect. The proposal here is that, within the general framework of MLE, this kind of problem may be understood in terms of ICMAUS.

As in some previous work [Belloti and Gammerman 96, Gammerman 91], the proposed solution assumes that some mechanism is available which can translate the geometric forms in each problem into patterns of alpha-numeric symbols like the patterns in other examples in this article. For example, item 'A' in Figure 17 may be described as 'small circle inside large triangle'.

How this kind of translation may be done is not part of the present pro-

```

0 A  small circle inside large triangle ; B large circle 0
    |           |           |           |           |
1 C2 small square inside large ellipse  ; E large square 1

0 above small triangle # 0
    |           |           |
1 above small ellipse  # 1

```

Figure 18: The best alignment found by SP61 for the patterns in New and Old as described in the text.

posals (one such translation mechanism is described in [Evans 68]). As noted elsewhere [Gammerman 91], successful solutions for this kind of problem require consistency in the way the translation is done. For this example, it would be unhelpful if item ‘A’ in Figure 17 were described as ‘large triangle outside small circle’ while item ‘C’ were described as ‘small square inside large ellipse’. For any one puzzle, the description needs to stick to one or other of “X outside Y” or “Y inside X” - and likewise for ‘above/below’ and ‘left-of/right-of’.

Given that the diagrammatic form of the problem has been translated into patterns as just described, this kind of problem can be cast as a problem of partial matching, well within the scope of SP61. To do this, symbolic representations of item A and item B in Figure 17 are treated as a single pattern, thus:

```

A small circle inside large triangle ;
  B large circle above small triangle #,

```

and this pattern is placed in New. Four other patterns are constructed by pairing a symbolic representation of item C (on the left) with symbolic representations of each of D, E, F and G (on the right), thus:

```

C1 small square inside large ellipse ;
  D small square inside large circle #
C2 small square inside large ellipse ;
  E large square above small ellipse #
C3 small square inside large ellipse ;
  F small circle left-of large square #
C4 small square inside large ellipse ;
  G small ellipse above large triangle #

```

These four patterns are placed in Old, each with an arbitrary frequency value of 1.

Figure 18 shows the best alignment found by SP61 with New and Old as just described. The alignment is a partial match between the pattern in New and the second of the four patterns in Old. This corresponds with the ‘correct’ result (item E) as noted above.

13 Explaining away ‘explaining away’: ICMAUS as an alternative to Bayesian networks

In recent years, *Bayesian networks* (otherwise known as *causal nets*, *influence diagrams*, *probabilistic networks* and other names) have become popular as a means of representing probabilistic knowledge and for probabilistic reasoning (see [Pearl 88]).

A Bayesian network is a directed, acyclic graph like the one shown in Figure 19 (below) where each node has zero or more ‘inputs’ (connections with nodes that can influence the given node) and one or more ‘outputs’ (connections to other nodes that the given node can influence).

Each node contains a set of conditional probability values, each one the probability of a given output value for a given input value. With this information, conditional probabilities of alternative outputs for any node may be computed for any given *combination* of inputs. By combining these calculations for sequences of nodes, probabilities may be propagated through the network from one or more ‘start’ nodes to one or more ‘finishing’ nodes.

No attempt will be made in this article to discuss in detail how Bayesian networks may be modelled in the ICMAUS framework or to compare the two approaches to probabilistic inference. However, an example is presented below showing how ICMAUS may provide an alternative to a Bayesian network explanation of the phenomenon of “explaining away”.

13.1 A Bayesian network explanation of “explaining away”

In the words of Judea Pearl [Pearl 88, p. 7], the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’ may be characterised as: “If A implies B, C implies B, and B is true, then finding that C is true makes A *less* credible. In other words, finding a second explanation for an item of data makes the first explanation less credible.” (his italics). Here is an example described by [Pearl 88, pp. 8-9]:

Normally an alarm sound alerts us to the possibility of a burglary. If somebody calls you at the office and tells you that your alarm went off, you will surely rush home in a hurry, even though there could be other causes for the alarm sound. If you hear a radio announcement that there was an earthquake nearby, and if the last false alarm you recall was triggered by an earthquake, then your certainty of a burglary will diminish.

Although it is not normally presented as an example of nonmonotonic reasoning, this kind of effect in the way we react to new information is similar to the example we considered in Section 11 because new information has an impact on inferences that we formed on the basis of information that was available earlier.




Figure 19: A Bayesian network representing causal relationships discussed in the text. In this diagram, “Phone call” means “a phone call about the alarm going off” and “Radio announcement” means “a radio announcement about an earthquake”.

The causal relationships in the example just described may be captured in a Bayesian network like the one shown in Figure 19.

[Pearl 88] argues that, with appropriate values for conditional probability, the phenomenon of “explaining away” can be explained in terms of this network (representing the case where there is a radio announcement of an earthquake) compared with the same network without the node for “radio announcement” (representing the situation where there is no radio announcement of an earthquake).

13.2 Representing contingencies with patterns and frequencies

To see how this phenomenon may be understood in terms of ICMAUS, consider, first, the set of patterns shown in Figure 20, which are to be stored in Old. The first four patterns in the figure show events which occur together in some notional sample of the ‘World’ together with their frequencies of occurrence in the sample.

Like other knowledge-based systems, an ICMAUS system would normally be used with a ‘closed-world’ assumption that, for some particular domain, the knowledge stored in the knowledge base is comprehensive. Thus, for example, a travel booking clerk using a database of all flights between cities will assume that, if no flight is shown between, say, Edinburgh and Paris, then no such flight exists. Of course, the domain may be only ‘flights provided by one particular airline’, in which case the booking clerk would need to check databases for

```

alarm phone_alarm_call (980)
earthquake alarm (20)
earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement (40)
burglary alarm (1000)
e1 earthquake e2 (40)

```

Figure 20: A set of patterns to be stored in Old in an example of ‘explaining away’. The symbol ‘phone_alarm_call’ is intended to represent a phone call conveying news that the alarm sounded; ‘radio_earthquake_announcement’ represents an announcement on the radio that there has been an earthquake. The symbols ‘e1’ and ‘e2’ represent other contexts for ‘earthquake’ besides the contexts ‘alarm’ and ‘radio_earthquake_announcement’.

other airlines. In systems like Prolog, the closed-world assumption is the basis of ‘negation as failure’: if a proposition cannot be proved with the clauses provided in a Prolog program then, in terms of that store of knowledge, the proposition is assumed to be false.

In the present case, we shall assume that the closed-world assumption applies so that the absence of any pattern may be taken to mean that the corresponding pattern of events did not occur, at least not with a frequency greater than one would expect by chance.

The fourth pattern shows that there were 1000 occasions when there was a burglary and the alarm went off and the second pattern shows just 20 occasions when there was an earthquake and the alarm went off (presumably triggered by the earthquake). Thus we have assumed that burglaries are much more common than earthquakes. Since there is no pattern showing the simultaneous occurrence of an earthquake, burglary and alarm, we shall infer from the closed-world assumption that this constellation of events was not recorded during the sampling period.

The first pattern shows that, out of the 1020 cases when the alarm went off, there were 980 cases where a telephone call about the alarm was made. Since there is no pattern showing telephone calls (about the alarm) in any other context, the closed-world assumption allows us to assume that there were no false positives (including hoaxes): telephone calls about the alarm when no alarm had sounded.

Some of the frequencies shown in Figure 20 are intended to reflect the two probabilities suggested for this example in [Pearl 88, p. 49]: “... the [alarm] is sensitive to earthquakes and can be accidentally ($P = 0.20$) triggered by one. ... if an earthquake had occurred, it surely ($P = 0.40$) would be on the [radio] news.”

In our example, the frequency of ‘earthquake alarm’ is 20, the frequency of ‘earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement’ is 40 and the frequency of ‘earthquake’ in other contexts is 40. Since there is no pattern like ‘earthquake alarm radio_earthquake_announcement’ or ‘earthquake radio_earthquake_announcement alarm’ representing cases where an earthquake triggers the alarm and also leads to a radio announcement, we may assume that

cases of that kind have not occurred. As before, this assumption is based on the closed-world assumption that the set of patterns is a reasonably comprehensive representation of non-random associations in this small world.

The pattern at the bottom, with its frequency, shows that an earthquake has occurred on 40 occasions in contexts where the alarm did not ring and there was no radio announcement.

13.3 Approximating the temporal order of events

In these patterns and in the alignments shown below, the left-to-right order of symbols may be regarded as an approximation to the order of events in time. Thus, in the first pattern, ‘phone_alarm_call’ (a phone call to say the alarm has gone off) follows ‘alarm’ (the alarm itself); in the second pattern, ‘alarm’ follows ‘earthquake’ (the earthquake which, we may guess, triggered the alarm); and so on. A single dimension can only approximate the order of events in time because it cannot represent events which overlap in time or which occur simultaneously. However, this kind of approximation has little or no bearing on the points to be illustrated here.

13.4 Other considerations

Other points relating to the patterns shown in Figure 20 include:

- No attempt has been made to represent the idea that “the last false alarm you recall was triggered by an earthquake” [Pearl 88, p. 9]. At some stage in the development of the SP system, an attempt may be made to take account of recency.
- With these imaginary frequency values, it has been assumed that burglaries (with a total frequency of occurrence of 1160) are much more common than earthquakes (with a total frequency of 100). As we shall see, this difference reinforces the belief that there has been a burglary when it is known that the alarm has gone off (but without additional knowledge of an earthquake).
- In accordance with Pearl’s example [Pearl 88, p. 49] (but contrary to the phenomenon of looting during earthquakes), it has been assumed that earthquakes and burglaries are independent. If there was some association between them, then, in accordance with the closed-world assumption, there should be a pattern in Figure 20 representing the association.

13.5 Formation of alignments: the burglar alarm has sounded

Receiving a phone call to say that one’s house alarm has gone off may be represented by placing the symbol ‘phone_alarm_call’ in New. Figure 21 shows, at the top, the best alignment formed by SP61 in this case with the patterns from




Figure 21: The best alignment (at the top) and the other three alignments in its reference set formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘phone_alarm_call’ in New and the patterns from Figure 20 in Old. In order from the top, the values for CD with relative probabilities in brackets are: 19.91 (0.6563), 18.91 (0.3281), 14.52 (0.0156).

Figure 20 in Old. The other two alignments in the reference set are shown below the best alignment, in order of CD value and relative probability. The actual values for CD and relative probability are given in the caption to Figure 20.

The unmatched symbols in these alignments represent inferences made by the system. The probabilities for these symbols which are calculated by SP61 (using the method described in Section 4) are shown in Table 6. These probabilities do not add up to 1 and we should not expect them to because any given alignment can contain two or more of these symbols.

The most probable inference is the rather trivial inference that the alarm has indeed sounded. This reflects the fact that there is no pattern in Figure 20 representing false positives for telephone calls about the alarm. Apart from the inference that the alarm has sounded, the most probable inference ($p = 0.3281$) is that there has been a burglary. However, there is a distinct possibility that there has been an earthquake - but the probability in this case ($p = 0.0156$) is much lower than the probability of a burglary.

These inferences and their relative probabilities seem to accord quite well with what one would naturally think following a telephone call to say that the

| <i>Symbol</i> | <i>Probability</i> |
|---------------|--------------------|
| alarm | 1.0 |
| burglary | 0.3281 |
| earthquake | 0.0156 |

Table 6: The probabilities of unmatched symbols, calculated by SP61 for the four alignments shown in Figure 21. The probability of ‘phone_alarm_call’ is 1.0 because it is supplied as a ‘fact’ in New.

burglar alarm at one’s house has gone off (given that one was living in a part of the world where earthquakes were not vanishingly rare).

13.6 Formation of alignments: the burglar alarm has sounded and there is a radio announcement of an earthquake

In this example, the phenomenon of ‘explaining away’ occurs when you learn not only that the burglar alarm has sounded but that there has been an announcement on the radio that there has been an earthquake. In terms of the ICMAUS model, the two events (the phone call about the alarm and the announcement about the earthquake) can be represented in New by a pattern like this:

`‘phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement’`

or ‘radio_earthquake_announcement phone_alarm_call’. The order of the two symbols does not matter because it makes no difference to the result, except for the order in which columns appear in the best alignment.

In this case, there is only one alignment (shown at the top of Figure 22) that can ‘explain’ all the information in New. Since there is only this one alignment in the reference set for the best alignment, the associated probabilities of the inferences that can be read from the alignment (‘alarm ’ and ‘earthquake’) are 1.0.

These results show broadly how ‘explaining away’ may be explained in terms of ICMAUS. The main point is that the alignment or alignments that provide the best ‘explanation’ of a telephone call to say that one’s burglar alarm has sounded is different from the alignment or alignments that best explain the same telephone call coupled with an announcement on the radio that there has been an earthquake. In the latter case, the best explanation is that the earthquake triggered the alarm. Other possible explanations have lower probabilities.

13.7 Other possible alignments

The foregoing account of ‘explaining away’ in terms of ICMAUS is not entirely satisfactory because it does not say enough about alternative explanations of what has been observed. This subsection tries to plug this gap.

```

0           phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
              |
1         alarm phone_alarm_call                          | 1
              |
2 earthquake alarm                                       | 2
              |
3 earthquake                                           radio_earthquake_announcement 3

```

(a)

```

0 phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
              |
1 earthquake       radio_earthquake_announcement 1

```

(b)

```

0     phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
              |
1 alarm phone_alarm_call                          1

```

(c)

```

0           phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
              |
1         alarm phone_alarm_call                          1
              |
2 burglary alarm                                       2

```

(d)

```

0           phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement 0
              |
1         alarm phone_alarm_call                          1
              |
2 earthquake alarm                                       2

```

(e)

Figure 22: At the top, the best alignment formed by SP61 with the pattern ‘phone_alarm_call radio_earthquake_announcement’ in New and the patterns from Figure 20 in Old. Other alignments formed by SP61 are shown below. From the top, the CD values are: 74.64, 54.72, 19.92, 18.92, and 14.52.




Figure 23: Two alignments discussed in the text. (a) An alignment created by combining the second and fourth alignment from Figure 22. $CD = 73.64$, Absolute $P = 5.5391e-5$. (b) An alignment created from the first alignment in Figure 22 and the symbol ‘burglary’. $CD = 72.57$, Absolute $P = 2.6384e-5$.

What is missing from the account of ‘explaining away’ in the previous subsection is any consideration of such other possibilities as, for example:

- A burglary (which triggered the alarm) and, at the same time, an earthquake (which led to a radio announcement), or
- An earthquake that triggered the alarm and led to a radio announcement and, at the same time, a burglary that did not trigger the alarm.
- And many other unlikely possibilities of a similar kind.

Alternatives of this kind may be created by combining alignments shown in Figure 22 with each other, or with patterns or symbols from Old, or both these things. The two examples just mentioned are shown in Figure 23.

Any alignment created by combining alignments as just described may be evaluated in exactly the same way as the alignments formed directly by SP61. CDs and absolute probabilities for the two example alignments are shown in the caption to Figure 23.

Given the existence of alignments like those shown in Figure 23, values for relative probabilities of alignments will change. The best alignment from Figure 22 and the two alignments from Figure 23 constitute a reference set because they all ‘encode’ the same symbols from New. However, there are probably

| <i>Alignment</i> | <i>Absolute probability</i> | <i>Relative probability</i> |
|------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| (a) in Figure 22 | 1.1052e-4 | 0.5775 |
| (a) in Figure 23 | 5.5391e-5 | 0.2881 |
| (b) in Figure 23 | 2.6384e-5 | 0.1372 |

Table 7: Values for absolute and relative probability for the best alignment in Figure 22 and the two alignments in Figure 23.

several other alignments that one could construct that would belong in the same reference set.

Given a reference set containing the first alignment in Figure 22 and the two alignments in Figure 23, values for relative probabilities are shown in Table 7, together with the absolute probabilities from which they were derived. Whichever measure is used, the alignment which was originally judged to represent the best interpretation of the available facts has not been dislodged from this position.

14 Conclusion

In this article, I have outlined the concept of *information compression by multiple alignment, unification and search* as it has been developed in this research program and, with examples, have tried to show how the ICMAUS paradigm may provide a framework within which various kinds of probabilistic reasoning may be understood. Substantially more detail about these ideas may be found in [Wolff 98a, Wolff 98b, Wolff 98c].

This approach to understanding probabilistic reasoning seems to be sufficiently promising to merit further investigation and development.

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